Application Security
Web, mobile, desktop
Testing the application itself based on industry standards like OWASP: authentication, authorization, session handling, business logic, and the boundaries where user input reaches something that acts on it.
04 Service
Security built into the way your team already designs, reviews, and releases, so it holds without slowing delivery.
01 Overview
Whether the software your team is building can be attacked, and whether the way they build it will keep producing the same problem.
02 Engagements
When customers start raising security questions, teams usually begin with application testing. For new builds, threat modeling delivers earlier value, while design can still change quickly.
Web, mobile, desktop
Testing the application itself based on industry standards like OWASP: authentication, authorization, session handling, business logic, and the boundaries where user input reaches something that acts on it.
With the source in front of us
Reading the code and the design together. Source review finds the paths a black box test never reaches, dead-looking branches, error handling, and the assumptions one component makes about another.
Before it is built
Working through a design to find where it can go wrong while changing it is still reasonable. Usually a facilitated session with the people who own the system rather than a document we write and hand over. The output that matters is the shared understanding in the room; the diagram is a by-product.
Models, prompts, agents, tool access
Prompt injection, unsafe tool invocation, retrieval poisoning (RAG), and what happens when the model is persuaded to act outside its brief.
Pipelines, secrets, dependencies
The build system is production: it holds credentials, it can deploy, and it is often the least reviewed part of an infrastructure. We look at pipeline permissions, artifact origin, secret handling, and the dependency chain.
03 Process
Working alongside your team while testing the systems.
A session with the engineers, and access to whatever documentation exists. We would rather spend the first day learning what the application is for than begin testing it immediately. Business logic flaws are invisible unless you know what the business logic is supposed to be.
Whether this is black box, credentialed, or full source review, and which components matter most.
Manual work against the running application, the source, or both. Findings are raised as they are confirmed.
We would rather explain a finding to the person who will fix it than write a longer description of it. We discuss approaches instead of prescribing one.
Where it applies, we help put the check into your pipeline, your review template, or your threat model so the same class of issue is caught next time.
Verification that fixes are correct and have not introduced something new. Security fixes made under time pressure are a reliable source of the next finding.
04 Deliverable
05 Questions
Those tools find the classes of issue that can be described as patterns: known-vulnerable dependencies, injection sinks, hardcoded secrets. They cannot find a broken authorization model, because that requires knowing who should be allowed to do what, and that is not in the code.
It can, if it is done badly. Security that adds gates without adding capability gets routed around, and then you have friction and no benefit. The aim is to put checks where developers already look, with failure conditions they agree are worth failing a build for.
For code review, yes. For application testing, no, though credentials and a walkthrough raise the value considerably.
We give you the detail and the reasoning, discuss approaches, and review your fix.
While the design can still change. Doing it after release is not useless, but it turns findings into a backlog of expensive retrofits rather than decisions. If a system is already built, application testing usually tells you more.
The surrounding application is tested the same way. What differs is that the model is a component whose output cannot be fully constrained, so the question becomes what it is permitted to reach and what downstream systems trust it with. Most real findings are in the wiring, not the model.
06 Contact
TowerVector will assist you in taking your security strategy to the next level. Please feel free to contact us: